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Patent Eligibility of Emerging Computer Technologies in the Aftermath of Alice Corp. v. CLS 
Bank 
 
By: Michael J. Campolongo 
 
I. Introduction 
Computer technology innovations are the most frequent technologies for which patent 
protection is sought worldwide.1  A study by the United States Government Accountability 
Office found that the number of software-related patents granted in the United States has steadily 
grown from 30% of all patents granted in 1991 to about half of all patents granted in 2011.2  
Since 2011, the number has exceeded 50% and continues to grow.3  The number of patents 
granted worldwide on artificial intelligence (AI), in particular, has exhibited an almost 
exponential increase from about 100 in 2000 to almost 3,000 in 2016, with more than half being 
granted in the United States alone.  These trends in computer technologies are likely to continue 
to dominate the patent landscape as emerging technologies continue to develop and proliferate at 
a rapid pace. 
                                                          
1 About 7% of patent applications published in 2015 worldwide were directed to computer technology, followed by 
electrical machinery, measurement, digital communication, and medical technologies.  World Intellectual Property 
Indicators 2017, World Intellectual Property Association, 36 (2017), 
www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_941_2017.pdf. 
2 Intellectual Property: Assessing Factors that Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent 
Quality, United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, GAO-13-465, 
(Aug. 2013), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/657103.pdf. 
3 R. Millien, Alice Who? Over Half the U.S. Utility Patents Issued Annually are Software Related!, IPWatchdog, 
(May 21, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/05/21/alice-over-half-u-s-utility-patents-issued-annually-
software/id=83367/. 
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In the United States, patent law is governed by federal statute, which sets out three 
requirements for patentability.4  First, under the “subject matter eligibility” requirement, the 
invention must fit within one of several patent-eligible categories of subject matter.5  Second, 
under the “novelty” requirement, the invention must not have been in public use, publicly 
disclosed, or commercially available prior to filing the patent application, with some exceptions 
for actions taken by the inventor or inventors.6  Third, under the “non-obviousness” requirement, 
the invention must be objectively non-obvious to a hypothetical skilled person in the field of the 
invention.7 
Since the mid-1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court has placed limits on the types of computer-
based inventions that are eligible for patent protection out of concerns over the patenting of 
general technological principles.8  Even with these limits, meeting the subject matter eligibility 
requirement in the 1990s and 2000s was not as significant a barrier to obtaining patent protection 
for computer innovations as were the requirements for novelty and non-obviousness.9  In 2014, 
however, a divided Supreme Court held in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l that claims to 
a computerized process for mitigating risk in a financial exchange were patent ineligible and thus 
                                                          
4 An additional “disclosure” requirement must also be satisfied, which pertains to the manner in which the inventor 
describes the invention and not to the inventive subject matter itself.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012). 
5 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012. 
6 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the claimed invention was patented, 
described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective 
filing date of the claimed invention”). 
7 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the 
claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before 
the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed 
invention pertains”). 
8 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 606 (2010) (“With ever more people trying to innovate and thus seeking patent 
protections for their inventions, the patent law faces a great challenge in striking the balance between protecting 
inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that others would discover by independent, creative 
application of general principles.”). 
9 See Harrison B. Rose, Exploring Alice’s Wonderland of Patentable Subject Matter, 2017 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 
275, 276 (2017). 
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invalid.10  Although the decision stems from the Court’s apprehensions over the abstract nature 
of so-called “business method patents,” Alice has far-reaching implications for a wide array of 
software innovations outside of the business context.11  Moreover, the decision has called into 
question the validity of many patents issued during the last two decades under a less stringent 
standard.12 
This paper examines the implications of Alice on the emerging technologies of AI, 
blockchain and cryptocurrency, and three-dimensional (3D) printing.  Section II reviews the 
historical precedents of subject matter eligibility leading up to Alice.  Section III discusses Alice 
along with its implications and criticisms.  Section IV discusses the aftermath of Alice and a 
string of Federal Circuit decisions that followed.  Section V discusses the impact of Alice and 
recent Federal Circuit decisions on patent eligibility of specific emerging technologies.  This 
paper concludes with Section VI, where I argue that the Alice decision, despite its criticisms, has 
a net positive effect on innovation.  I also discuss strategies for how patent applicants should 
prepare their applications to survive subject matter eligibility challenges. 
II. Software Patent Eligibility Prior to Alice 
The statutory requirement for patent eligibility is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which states 
that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”13  On its face, this statute appears to 
                                                          
10 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2349 (2014). 
11 Netflix, Inc. v. Rovi Corp., 114 F.Supp.3d 927, 935 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
12 CLS Bank Int’l. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part) (concerned that the 
breadth of the holding “is the death of hundreds of thousands of patents, including all business method, financial 
system, and software patents as well as many computer implemented and telecommunications patents”). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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allow for an inventor to seek protection so long as the invention falls into one of the four 
categories.  Despite this broad language, the long-recognized position of the Supreme Court has 
been that abstract ideas, laws of nature, and natural phenomena are ineligible for patenting, even 
if they would otherwise fall into one of the statutory categories.14  These three specific ineligible 
categories are referred to as the “judicial exceptions” to patent eligibility.15  The judicial 
exceptions serve public interest by preventing inventors from claiming patent rights in “the basic 
tools of scientific and technological work,” the monopolization of which “might tend to impede 
innovation more than it would tend to promote it.”16  The Court has clarified, however, that an 
invention is not automatically patent ineligible if it involves one of the judicial exceptions—the 
invention can still be patent eligible if it “come[s] from the application of the law of nature to a 
new and useful end.”17 
The Court’s jurisprudence on patent eligibility over the last several decades has been 
shaped largely by the advent and development of computer technology starting in the mid-
twentieth century.  The earliest case that addressed the eligibility of computer algorithms was 
Gottschalk v. Benson in 1972.18  In Benson, a patent applicant sought protection for an 
algorithmic method of converting binary coded decimal (BCD) signals into pure binary signals.19  
The Court found the claimed process to be patent ineligible for being “so abstract and sweeping 
as to cover both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion,” concluding 
                                                          
14 See Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”); see 
also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
15 See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2106, 9th ed., rev. 8 (Jan. 2018). 
16 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354 (quoting Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 
576, 589 (2013) and Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs. Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)). 
17 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 
(1948)). 
18 Id. at 65. 
19 Id. at 67. 
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that granting such a patent would “wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in practical 
effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”20 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue six years later in Parker v. Flook, this time 
reviewing a patent application related to a method for updating numerical alarm limits used for 
triggering alarms during the monitoring of industrial processes.21  Here, the patent applicant 
attempted to distinguish the claimed process from Benson, arguing that the claims did not 
preempt all uses of the claimed algorithm because they allowed room for other uses outside of 
the petrochemical and oil-refining industry.22  The Court rejected this argument as a narrow 
reading of Benson because it incorrectly assumed that a process is patent eligible by 
implementing a principle in a specific fashion.23  Furthermore, the Court held that adjusting an 
alarm limit was merely a “post-solution activity” that was not enough to render the algorithm 
eligible for patenting.24 
A few years after Flook, the Court once again addressed the eligibility of software patents 
in Diamond v. Diehr, where it held that an application of a mathematical formula to a rubber 
curing process was patent eligible.25  The Court recognized that the patent applicants “[did] not 
seek to patent a mathematical formula,” and although it acknowledged that “their process 
employs a well-known mathematical equation, they [did] not seek to pre-empt the use of that 
equation, except in conjunction with all of the other steps in their claimed process.”26 
                                                          
20 Id. at 71-72. 
21 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978). 
22 Id. at 589-91. 
23 Id., at 593 (determining the eligibility of patentable subject matter would “depend simply on the draftsman's art 
and would ill serve the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas’ or phenomena of nature”). 
24 Id., at 590. 
25 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1981). 
26 Id. at 187. 
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The key difference between the claims at issue in Diehr and those of Benson and Flook 
was that the Diehr claims did not simply recite the practical application of the process as a post-
solution activity, but instead tied the elements of the algorithm to the process “as a whole.”27  
Each algorithmic computation of the Diehr patent claims is associated with a non-computational 
physical action taken in order to control the curing process (i.e., “constantly providing the 
computer with the temperature,” “calculat[ing] . . . the Arrhenius equation,” “repetitively 
comparing . . . total required cure time calculated with the Arrhenius equation and said elapsed 
time, and opening the press automatically when a said comparison indicates completion of 
curing”).28 
What could be gleaned from Benson, Flook, and Diehr was that software algorithms that 
only solved mathematical problems were not patentable unless the solution was used to perform 
a particular task while further satisfying the novelty, utility, and non-obviousness requirements.29  
Despite Diehr’s apparent victory for software-based processes, it was still not clear whether tasks 
performed solely by a computer implementing the algorithms were per se unpatentable.  The 
majority in Dierh avoided addressing the question, while the dissenting justices believed it was 
not for the Court to decide.30 
In the decades that followed Diehr, however, nearly all software patent cases heard by the 
Federal Circuit were found to be patent eligible.31  Notable Federal Circuit cases of the 1990s 
where software innovations were found to be patent eligible include In re Lowry, Arrhythmia 
                                                          
27 Id. at 188 (“In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for patent protection under 
[35 U.S.C.] § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole”). 
28 U.S. Patent No. 4,344,142 col. 7 l. 1 (issued Aug. 10, 1982) 
29 George B. Delta & Jeffrey H. Matsuura, Law of the Internet § 13.02 (4th ed. 2018). 
30 Diehr, at 216-17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The broad question whether computer programs should be given 
patent protection involves policy considerations that this Court is not authorized to address”). 
31 See The History of Software Patents: From Benson, Flook, and Diehr to Bilski and Mayo v. Prometheus, 
BITLAW, http://www.bitlaw.com/software-patent/history.html (last visited May 7, 2018). 
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Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., and State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc.32  In these cases, the Federal Circuit applied the “machine-or-
transformation” test, which finds a claimed process patent eligible if: (1) it is tied to a particular 
machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.33 
The patent in State Street was directed to a system of implementing an investment 
structure for use by an administrator of a mutual fund.34  In applying the machine-or-
transformation test, the Court first found that the claims were directed to a machine or process by 
virtue of the specific structures claimed (e.g., a “CPU,” a “data disk,” and an “arithmetic logic 
circuit”), reasoning that the inclusion of such components is enough to categorize the claims as a 
statutory “machine.”35  Although the analysis could have ended here, the Court further evaluated 
the second element of the test to overturn the judicially-created “business method exception” 
relied on by the district court.36  Here, the Court reasoned that, even if the patent claims were 
directed toward an abstract idea, they could nevertheless be patentable.37  In the case of business 
methods, the transformation of data representing dollar amounts through a series of mathematical 
calculations was deemed to constitute a practical application of an abstract idea that creates “a 
useful, concrete and tangible result,” representing a transformation within the meaning of the 
machine-or-transformation test.38 
                                                          
32 See In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (memory storing a data structure found patentable); 
Arrhythmia Research Technology Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (transformation of 
electrocardiograph signals through mathematical calculations found patentable); State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. 
Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (data processing system for implementing an 
investment structure found patentable). 
33 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 600. 
34 State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1370. 
35 Id. at 1371-72; To be precise, the specific structure was not explicit in the claims, but was construed to be present 
as a result of a claim interpretation derived from 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
36 Id. at 1375. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 1373. 
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It is difficult to envision a scenario in which a software invention would not pass the 
machine-or-transformation test after State Street.  Given this broad holding, it would appear that 
any algorithm could meet the patent eligibility requirement so long as computer components are 
baked into the patent claims, which would appear to reduce patent eligibility to a mere formality 
overcome by “the draftsmen’s art” that the Supreme Court cautioned against in Flook.39 
While the 1990s set the bar low for patent eligibility, the standard began to shift back 
toward that of Benson and Flook in the next decade.40  For example, the Federal Circuit case 
In re Comiskey dealt with patent claims directed to a method and system for mandatory 
arbitration resolution involving legal documents.41  The Court clarified that, despite what seemed 
to be a broad holding in State Street, business methods were still “subject to the same legal 
requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method.”42  The claims were 
found to be directed to the mental process of resolving a legal dispute, and thus ineligible for 
attempting to “patent the use of human intelligence in and of itself.”43  Although many of the 
claims recited computer components, the Court dismissed these recitations, reasoning that “[t]he 
routine addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a 
prima facie case of obviousness.”44  It is worth noting that, in making this determination, the 
Court folded the non-obviousness inquiry of 35 U.S.C. § 103 into the patent eligibility inquiry of 
35 U.S.C. § 101.45  Such mixing of the statutory requirements would eventually become a staple 
                                                          
39 Flook, 437 U.S. at 593. 
40 See Rose, supra note 9, at 282. 
41 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
42 Id. at 1374 (quoting State St. Bank & Tr. Co., 149 F.3d at 1375). 
43 Id. at 1379. 
44 Id. at 1380. 
45 Id. 
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of patent ineligibility analysis going forward, and is one of the major criticisms of the Alice 
decision.46 
In 2010, in Bilski v. Kappos the Supreme Court heard its first software case in nearly 
thirty years after Diehr.47  The patent application at issue in Bilski claimed a system for allowing 
commodities buyers and sellers in the energy market to hedge against the risk of price changes.48  
The Court held this to be an unpatentable abstract idea out of preemption concerns.49  Signaling 
its distaste for the Federal Circuit’s patent eligibility framework, the majority and concurring 
justices chastised the Federal Circuit for its overreliance on the machine-or-transformation test, 
recharacterizing it as an “important example of how a court can determine patentability under 
[35 U.S.C.] § 101,” and emphasizing that the Federal Circuit erred “by treating it as the exclusive 
test.”50  The Court, however, did not overrule prior cases, such as State Street, and the majority 
opinion urged the Federal Circuit to persist in the “development of other limiting criteria that 
further the Patent Act’s purposes.”51 
While Bilski did not articulate a new standard for evaluating subject matter eligibility, the 
Court would revisit the eligibility issue twice more in the next few years. 
III. The Modern Legal Framework for Patent Eligibility: The Two-Prong Test 
In 2012, the Court for the first time articulated a test for patent eligibility in Mayo 
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.52  The patent at issue related to the use 
                                                          
46 See, e.g., Paxton M. Lewis, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: Alice’s Substitution of Section 
103, Utah L. Rev. OnLaw 13, 14 (2017). 
47 Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 611-12 (“Allowing petitioners to patent risk hedging would pre-empt use of this approach in all fields, and 
would effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.”). 
50 Id. at 659 (emphasis in the original). 
51 Id. at 612-13. 
52 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 77 (2012). 
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of thiopurine drugs for the treatment of autoimmune diseases.53  In evaluating the patent claims, 
the Court first asked (1) whether the claims were directed to a law of nature, natural phenomena, 
or an abstract idea; and (2) if so, whether the claims do significantly more than merely recite one 
of these three concepts.54  Applying the first prong, the Court determined that the claims, which 
described a process for observing indicators of when a drug concentration in the bloodstream 
was too high or too low, were directed to a law of nature.55  Applying the second prong, the 
Court determined that the claims did not rise to the level of adding “significantly more.”56  The 
Court reiterated its old precedents and heeded its own warnings against circumvention of the 
eligibility requirements through the “draftsman’s art” and “insignificant postsolution activity.”57  
For the particular patent in question, the Court held that the claims amounted to “nothing 
significantly more than an instruction to doctors to apply the applicable laws [of nature] when 
treating their patients.”58 
In 2014, the Supreme Court once again took up the eligibility issue in Alice, applying the 
two-prong test from the biotech-themed Mayo case to computerized business method patents.59  
The patents at issue, which were owned by Alice Corp., related to a computerized method of 
mitigating settlement risk using a third-party intermediary.60  Prior to reaching the Supreme 
Court, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s decision that the claims were directed to 
the abstract idea of “employing a neutral intermediary to facilitate simultaneous exchange of 
                                                          
53 Id. at 73. 
54 Id. at 72. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 79. 
57 Id. at 72-73. 
58 Id. at 79. 
59 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352. 
60 Id. 
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obligations in order to minimize risk,” but eventually reinstated the district court’s decision after 
rehearing the case en banc.61 
In applying the two-prong test, the Supreme Court first found that the patent claims were 
directed to the abstract idea of a fundamental economic practice.62  Since the concept was similar 
in nature to the abstract risk hedging of Bilski, the Court did not feel the need to “labor to delimit 
the precise contours of the ‘abstract ideas’ category in this case.”63  Next, the Court found that 
the claims did not amount to anything significantly more than the abstract idea.64  Alice Corp. 
argued that the claims required the “use of a computer to create electronic records, track multiple 
transactions, and issue simultaneous instructions.”65  It was further argued that the claims recited 
specific hardware to carry out these functions.66  The Court disagreed, noting that such computer 
activity was “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional,” and that “each step does no more 
than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.”67  Without specifying 
what would be needed to rise to the level of “significantly more,” the Court only hinted that 
improving upon the functioning of the computer itself or another technology may meet this 
standard.”68 
The Alice decision is controversial and has been criticized for failing to articulate a clear 
standard for determining what is abstract, and for conflating the eligibility analysis under 
35 U.S.C. § 101 with the obviousness analysis under 35 U.S.C. § 103.69  The majority opinion in 
                                                          
61 Id. at 2353 (citing CLS Bank Intern. v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F.Supp.2d 221, 252 (D.C. 2011)). 
62 Id. at 2356. 
63 Id. at 2357 (“It is enough to recognize that there is no meaningful distinction between the concept of risk hedging 
in Bilski and the concept of intermediated settlement at issue here.”). 
64 Id. at 2359-60. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Lewis, supra note 46, at 24. 
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Alice noted that abstract ideas are not limited to “preexisting, fundamental truths.”70  However, 
no specific insight was given as to the scope of these limits except for a comparison to Bilski 
essentially stating that the claims in Alice were abstract without involve preexisting, fundamental 
truths because the claims in Bilski were abstract without involving preexisting, fundamental 
truths.71  In addition, the Court looked to external references to support its conclusion that 
intermediated settlement was an industry standard, making it difficult to distinguish the patent 
eligibility analysis from a prior art analysis performed in an obviousness inquiry.72  In 
determining whether the claims amounted to significantly more than the abstract idea, the Court 
indicated that an “inventive concept” must be present, but only provided examples of what was 
not inventive (i.e., generic computer components) while leaving it an open question as to what 
would be.73  Without any clear articulation of how to apply the Alice analysis, the lower courts 
were left without the proper tools for analyzing abstractness and inventiveness, and without 
clarity in how to parse out the differences between patent eligibility and obviousness.74 
IV. The Aftermath of the Alice Decision 
In just two years after Alice, the Federal Circuit and district courts invalidated nearly 400 
patents on the basis of subject matter ineligibility (approximately two-thirds of such cases).75  
The patent office quickly developed its own guidelines in response to Alice, leading to more 
aggressive examination procedures that have created significant roadblocks to obtaining patent 
protection on software innovations.76 
                                                          
70 Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356. 
71 Lewis, supra note 46, at 24. 
72 Id. 
73 John Clizer, Exploring the Abstract: Patent Eligibility Post Alice Corp v. CLS Bank, 80 Mo. L. Rev. 537, 553 
(2015). 
74 Lewis, supra note 46, at 24. 
75 Jasper L. Tran, Two Years after Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. Pat. & Trademark Of. Soc'y 354, 356 (2016). 
76 Id. at 357-58. 
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While the impact has certainly been felt, a study by James E. Daily of Washington 
University suggests that perhaps it is not as strong of an impact as originally predicted by Judge 
Moore in his dissent.77  A change in the consistency in which patentees pay their post-grant 
maintenance fees, which are necessary to keep a patent remaining in force, may serve as a strong 
indicator of patentee response to Alice.78  It has been found that since Alice, patent abandonment 
rates via failure to pay maintenance fees has increased on average, leading to nearly an estimated 
80,000 abandonments within the first four years of Alice.79  While significant and likely 
influenced by speculation based on the invalidation rate of the courts, this is an order of 
magnitude lower than the “death of hundreds of thousands of patents” predicted by Judge 
Moore.80 
As of February, 2018, of the more than twenty-five cases heard by the Federal Circuit 
containing subject matter eligibility challenges, only about a third of the decisions have been 
favorable to the patentee/applicant.81  The first of these came in 2016 with the decision in DDR 
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.82  The patents at issue in DDR Holdings related to a system 
that directs a website visitor, in response to clicking on a third-party advertisement, to a 
composite website that includes both information from the third-party and the original website 
without diverting visitor traffic to the third-party’s website.83  The court distinguished the claims 
                                                          
77 James E. Daily, Alice’s Aftermath: Changes in Patentee Behavior Since Alice v. CLS Bank, 23 B.U. J. Sci. & 
Tech. L. 284, 302 (2017). 
78 Id. at 298-99. 
79 Id. 
80 Alice, 717 F.3d at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part). 
81 For a summary of Alice-related court decisions, visit the Alice Tracker provided by Fish & Richardson at 
https://www.fr.com/alice-tracker/. 
82 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
83 Id. at 1248. 
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from some of its recent cases where the claims were found abstract.84  Unlike these prior cases 
where the claims were considered to have only utilized computers generically, the claims of 
DDR Holdings recited “a specific way to automate the creation of a composite web page . . . to 
solve a problem faced by websites on the Internet.”85  While the court recognized the claimed 
invention solved the technical problem of “retaining control over the attention of the customer in 
the context of the Internet,” it was quick to clarify that “not all claims purporting to address 
Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.”86 
Two years later in Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit decided another 
subject matter eligibility case in favor of the patentee.87  The patent claims were directed to a 
self-referential data model for use in a computer database.88  The district court concluded that the 
claims were abstract for merely organizing data in a logical table.  The Federal Circuit disagreed 
with what it considered too high a level of abstraction, noting that the claimed self-referential 
table functioned differently than data structures of conventional databases.89  Importantly, the 
court recognized that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology 
just as hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can be accomplished 
through either route.”90 
                                                          
84 Id. at 1256-57 (citing Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 
(Fed.Cir. 2012) (use of a computer “employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive 
calculations”); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1344-45 (Fed.Cir. 
2013) (generalized software components to implement tasks associated with insurance policies); Ultramercial, 
Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715-16 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (using advertising as a currency in a particular 
technological environment); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed.Cir. 2014) (using a computer 
to create a “transaction performance guaranty”)). 
85 Id. at 1259. 
86 Id. at 1258. 
87 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1337. 
90 Id. at 1335. 
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Shortly after Enfish, the Federal Circuit found another software patent to be non-abstract 
in McRO v. Bandai Namco Games America.91  The court held that an algorithm for lip 
synchronization of animated characters was not abstract, but represented a technological 
improvement over pre-existing manual animation techniques.92  The court addressed concerns 
raised about preemption, noting that the rule-based structure of the claims was narrow and 
specific enough so as to not preempt all methods of automating lip synchronization.93 
Bascom v. AT&T Mobility is a case where the Federal Circuit held that claims directed to 
a method of filtering Internet content were abstract, but nevertheless found them inventive under 
the second prong of the Alice framework.94  In applying the first prong, the court distinguished 
the claims from Enfish, finding that they were not “unambiguously directed to an improvement 
in computer capabilities.95  In applying the second prong, the court agreed with the district court 
that the limitations of the claims individually recite generic, uninventive components.96  But the 
court ultimately found an inventive concept in the “ordered combination of claim limitations that 
transform the abstract idea of filtering content into a particular, practical application of that 
abstract idea.”97  
While only a minority of Federal Circuit cases sided with the patentee, these cases serve 
as guideposts in navigating the nebulous framework of Mayo/Alice.  One underlying theme of 
these pro-software cases is that computer innovations that represent specific improvements to 
computer technology are not abstract.98  Another is that claims drafted narrowly enough to avoid 
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preempting the use of the generic concept may weigh in the patentee’s favor when facing subject 
matter eligibility challenges.99  The next section will explore how these themes play out in 
analyzing certain emerging technologies. 
V. Patent Eligibility Issues for Emerging Computer Technologies 
In weighing the impact of Alice on emerging technologies, it is worth recalling the 
Constitutional purpose of the patent system to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”100  Given the controversies that often accompany new technologies, 
such as the patenting of technologies having open source origins, ethical concerns associated 
with AI and certain biotechnologies, and the preemption of innovation tools by overbroad patent 
protection, the question arises as to whether the patent system should be promoting the progress 
of all innovation.  In the narrower case of computer innovations, a variation on that question is 
this—do the Alice decision and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions serve the public interest by 
precluding certain classes of computer innovations from patentability? 
Despite its criticisms, Alice is thought to have a beneficial public impact by making it 
more difficult for non-practicing entities, referred to pejoratively as “patent trolls,” to assert 
invalid patents against vulnerable companies in what often amounts to shake-downs.101  In such 
cases, the courts have treated subject matter eligibility issues as a threshold question, thus 
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increasing judicial efficiency and reducing party costs by invalidating the patent at the onset of 
litigation.102 
A. Artificial Intelligence: Improvements and Applications 
AI, broadly speaking, is a branch of computer science pertaining to the mimicry of 
human cognitive functions by machines.103  Learning systems, such as artificial neural networks 
that are inspired by biological neural networks, can develop the ability to make determinations 
and classifications through training rather than through rules strictly defined via computer 
code.104  Natural language processing systems, for example, may utilize machine learning 
algorithms as well as statistical models for recognizing human speech and speech patterns, 
understanding the context of natural language, and performing automatic translation.105  
Applications of AI are far reaching, and have found their way into various industries including 
healthcare, automotive technology, and finance.  In the healthcare industry, for example, some 
surgical procedures have begun incorporating “smart machines” to assist with delicate 
maneuvers.106  Autonomous cars are now being tested on public roadways, simultaneously 
creating visions of sustainability and efficiency while raising safety and regulatory concerns.107 
AI innovations can be classified into two categories.  The first is innovations in AI itself, 
including improvements in machine learning, image/pattern recognition, and reasoning.  The 
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second is innovations that utilize AI techniques but are not innovations in the underlying AI 
per se.  An example would include a user interface that utilizes natural language processing to 
recognize and process speech, which is then used for another purpose such as playing music in 
response to a voice command. 
1. Innovations in AI 
Because of its mimicry of human activity, AI technology appears on its surface to be 
inherently susceptible to the Mayo/Alice framework.  The analogy, however, does not match up 
to the reality, as the methods for simulating human cognition are fundamentally different in 
nature from the biological processes from which they originate.108  The way that humans 
translate sentences, for example, differs greatly from AI-based translation systems, which utilize 
statistical approaches.109  It may be strategic in drafting a patent application to emphasize any 
such distinctions, which may serve as a basis for arguing that the claims do not cover mental 
steps.110 
In view of modern case law, advancements in AI are more likely to be patent eligible if 
the invention relates to a specific technical improvement, and any such improvements should be 
described with specificity.111  These technical improvements, however, can be difficult to 
describe in a patent application, particularly due to problems that AI innovators have faced in 
explaining the mechanism behind how some AI systems functions.112  To illustrate, suppose that 
an inventor designs an algorithm that defines a series of rules to be followed by an AI system in 
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adapting to new inputs.  The algorithm and rules would likely not be patent eligible.  If the 
algorithm leads to the AI system developing its own rules that ultimately improve its own data 
processing speed or efficiency, this combined result could likely be deemed a patent eligible 
invention.  But the inventor may nonetheless fail to satisfy the disclosure requirements if he or 
she cannot describe the mechanism effecting the improvements with specificity.113 
2. Applications of AI 
With the rising commercial exploitation of AI innovations, it should be expected that a 
large volume of new patent filings will be directed to applications of AI rather than 
improvements thereto.  It may be more difficult in such cases to show that the AI improves 
computer functionality, if the AI component is merely being used as a tool.  Since the use of AI 
will invariably result in the generation of data, the use of that data is more likely to be found 
patent eligible than the mere generation thereof.114  If an AI system itself is claimed without 
claiming its use, and if the written description of the patent does not provide any details as to the 
technical problem solved by the AI system, this would likely be deemed patent ineligible.115 
Recently, the Federal Circuit found an object tracking system for an aircraft to be patent-
eligible subject matter.116  The patent claims recited determining an orientation of the object 
relevant to a moving reference frame based on signals received from inertial sensors.117  The 
court held that the claims were not abstract because of the novel way that the patent claimed the 
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positioning and use of the inertial sensors, and that the use of the tracking algorithm by itself did 
not render the claims abstract.118 
As AI becomes more ubiquitous, it is likely that AI components in patent claims will be 
treated as generic computer components.  Including more details in the claims can likely help to 
avoid the claims being deemed abstract, but may unduly narrow the scope of protection 
sought.119  In cases that may require significant narrowing of the claims, trade secrecy may be a 
more viable form of IP protection.120 
B. Blockchain Technology 
Blockchains, which serve as the underlying technology making bitcoin and other 
decentralized electronic currencies possible, are distributed electronic ledgers that include chains 
of “blocks” representing transaction records.121  Each individual block stores information about a 
completed transaction, and is permanently stored in the blockchain ledger after its associated 
transaction has been verified.122  The blocks are linked in such a way that each transaction is part 
of a chain for which sequential transactions can be traced back to earlier transactions.123  The 
chain structure and its distributed nature increases security and reliability of the network by 
making it nearly impossible to fraudulently alter prior block entries.124  Using cryptographic 
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methods, reliable identification of all transactions recorded in the blockchain is possible without 
the need of a third-party intermediary to verify the transactions.125 
Blockchain is expected to have a significant impact on the business transaction 
landscape, ranging from arms-length transactions, such as stock trading to real estate, to ongoing 
corporate business transactions.126  The idea of “cryptosecurities” is being explored for use in 
high-frequency trading platforms and short sales.127  Various property recording offices, such as 
the Cook County Recorder’s office in Illinois, began experimenting in the last couple years with 
blockchain ledgers for tracking and transferring real property title.128  The great potential of 
blockchain technology has been recognized across the financial industry, with several large 
banks seeking to develop their own blockchain innovations and protect them with patents.129 
Blockchain technology, by its very nature, appears uniquely tailored to business 
purposes.  Consequently, individuals and organizations seeking to protect mere applications of 
blockchain technology to otherwise patent ineligible business methods may be ill-advised.   For 
example, suppose that the claims of U.S. Patent No. 7,725,375 at issue in Alice recited “storing 
the transaction in an encrypted block of a decentralized ledger” rather than in a “data storage 
unit,” as claimed.130  Assuming that blockchain had been known and used at the time of the 
invention, the Supreme Court would have likely found the claims to be no less abstract since 
they would have simply been implementing known computer techniques.  Based on today’s case 
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law, describing the use of a blockchain or the exchange of a cryptocurrency in a patent claim 
would very likely be treated as the use of a “generic component,” thus being unlikely to advance 
the claim over the threshold of abstractness. 
Although blockchain technology is well-suited to the implementation of business 
methods, the underlying framework and improvements thereto will likely be viewed as 
improvements to computer technology.131  The Federal Circuit’s Enfish decision sets a strong 
precedent for technologies that differ from their conventional counterparts.132  Where Enfish 
utilized a self-referential database that yielded increased speed and memory efficiency compared 
to conventional databases, blockchain technologies utilize cryptography and decentralization to 
solve the problems of conventional electronic ledgers pertaining to security and authenticity and, 
importantly, eliminates the need for third-party intermediaries.133  In cases where an 
improvement in the underlying technology can be clearly and succinctly articulated in the patent 
application, it may be possible to overcome or avoid an Alice challenge by specifically stating 
the specific improvement in the patent claims.134 
Blockchain innovations that focus primarily on encryption and decryption may have 
more difficulty in withstanding Alice challenges.  In the 2017 Federal Circuit case RecogniCorp 
LLC v. Nintendo Co., Ltd., the court held that claims directed to a method for encoding and 
decoding image data were patent ineligible.135  The court did not recognize any type of 
improvement in computer technology resulting from encoding and decoding algorithms, and 
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essentially concluded that such innovations were per se abstract.136  While the claims of 
RecogniCorp were related to image processing, this decision could likely be broadly applied to 
cryptography as well since encoding and decoding of data is the essence of cryptography.  Thus, 
to avoid being categorically classified as abstract, patent applicants should be cautious when 
claiming improvements to blockchain technology to include more than encryption and 
decryption.  
Many blockchain systems are open source, which can complicate intellectual property 
protection.137  Given public concern over companies patenting the use of open source 
components, the Alice decision may serve public interest in this regard by making it more 
difficult to obtain patent protection on the use of blockchain technologies.  Instead, Alice appears 
to incentivize innovation in the core underlying technology behind blockchain, which may lead 
to stronger patents and may be more acceptable to the public. 
C. Computer-Aided Design Files for 3D Printing 
3D printing is an additive manufacturing process that produces solid objects in a layer-
by-layer manner based on digital instructions that describe the geometry of the sequential 
layers.138  Unlike traditional subtractive manufacturing processes, such as milling, that start with 
bulk material for which material is removed to yield a final product, 3D printed objects are 
assembled from the ground up by adding small amounts of material until the final product 
emerges.139 
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In a typical 3D printing workflow, a designer uses a computer to generate a computer-
aided design (CAD) file that contains data descriptive of the three-dimensional geometry of the 
object.140  When it is time for 3D printing, the CAD file is subsequently converted into a file type 
readable by the 3D printer, such as a Standard Tessellation Language (STL) file.141  The 3D 
printer then prints the object by depositing small amounts of a liquid material, such as melted 
plastic, and curing with a laser to blend it together with previously deposited material until the 
final object is produced.142 
It is not difficult to surmise the various aspects of 3D printing that have been patented or 
are potentially protectable by patents, including mechanical components, software, the chemical 
compounds used, and the objects produced.  A not so obvious aspect of 3D printing for which 
patents are desirable is the CAD files themselves, which allow an individual equipped with a 3D 
printer to produce any object as long as he/she has the CAD file that encodes it.143  The ease of 
exchanging CAD files and the nature of what they encode gives rise to novel legal questions 
regarding subject matter eligibility and infringement.144 
Assuming that a 3D-printed object is protected by a patent, any individual who receives 
the associated CAD file and prints it would be liable as a direct infringer.145  Suing individuals 
for printing patented objects in the privacy of their homes is impractical, and could possibly 
having a chilling effect on innovation in this setting.  A more desirable and practical strategy 
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would be to sue the distributor of 3D CAD files.146  If the patent only covers the actual physical 
product, the distributor would clearly not be liable as a direct infringer.147  Theories of indirect 
infringement, however, would also pose problems in this situation.148  Under the theories of 
induced and contributory infringement, the patentee would have to prove that the distributor had 
knowledge of the patented object and that infringement would result from transmitting the CAD 
files to a recipient.149  Thus, unless indirect infringement statutes are amended to include the 
distribution of CAD files as an infringement inducing or contributory activity, a patentee’s 
options in the 3D printing community are limited. 
Although no specific case law exists yet on this topic, another solution would be for the 
courts to recognize CAD files as being patent eligible, which would allow patentees of CAD files 
to sue distributors as direct infringers.150  As discussed in Section I, for an invention to be 
patentable, it must be meet the subject matter eligibility, novelty, and obviousness requirements.  
For a 3D printed object to be patentable, the novelty and obviousness requirements must be met, 
while the subject-matter eligibility requirement will be trivial since a physical object easily falls 
into the category of machine or article of manufacture (and is clearly not an abstract idea).  A 
CAD file encoding for the 3D printed object, however, may have a more difficult time crossing 
the subject-matter eligibility threshold. 
The idea of a CAD file that encodes for the design of an otherwise patentable object is 
similar in nature to the well-known Beauregard claim, which is a way of claiming software in 
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the context of instructions encoded on a physical storage medium.151  A CAD file claimed in 
Beauregard style would be described, for example, as a “computer readable medium storing 
computer readable instructions which, when acted upon by a 3D printer, cause the printer to print 
a widget” in the preamble of the claim, while the attributes of the physical object produced 
therefrom would serve as the limiting elements of the claim.152  A distributor having a CAD file 
on its server that is read on by such a claim would be liable as a direct infringer for making the 
CAD file by virtue of its storage.153 
A disembodied version of the CAD file claim (i.e., one that omits the computer readable 
medium) may be more desirable from a royalty base perspective, since only a single act of 
infringement is likely to occur when storing the file on the server.154  This may make such a 
claim more susceptible to being deemed abstract, particularly in view of a 2014 Federal Circuit 
case.155  In Digitech Image Technologies., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., the court held 
that device profile data for a digital image reproduction system was patent ineligible because it 
was claimed without regard to any tangible medium.156 
Under an Alice analysis, it is very likely that claims to CAD files, and particularly 
disembodied CAD files, would be deemed abstract; however, the patentability of the claimed 
physical object should ultimately be treated as the “inventive concept” that satisfies the second 
prong of the test.  Enfish and its brethren provide little guidance for CAD files since they focus 
primarily on improvements to computer technology—arguing that a CAD file for a 3D printable 
                                                          
151 Brean, supra note 146, at 842-43; See also In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (a computer 
program stored on a floppy diskette met the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 and did not run afoul of the “printed 
matter doctrine”). 
152 Brean, supra note 146, at 844. 
153 Id. at 846. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Digitech Image Technologies., LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1348-49 (2014). 
28 
 
object represents an improvement in computer technology would be nonsensical.  However, a 
patentee would have a strong argument that the claimed CAD file does not have a preemptive 
effect like a claim to an abstract concept or mathematical expression would, provided that the 
CAD file is limited in scope to the production of an otherwise patentable physical object.157 
VI. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Alice significantly changed the framework for the 
subject matter eligibility analysis, transforming the practically toothless interpretation of 
35 U.S.C. § 101 in the 1990s into public enemy number one for today’s patentees and patent 
applicants.  While Alice, and its predecessor Mayo, mark the first time the Court laid out a test 
for subject matter eligibility, this test has been met with criticism for its alleged overbreadth and 
lack of clarity, as well as for the confusion it created in the lower courts as to how the standard 
should be applied. 
In view of the Alice/Mayo framework, software innovators should give considerable 
thought to where their intellectual property resources are allocated.  Prior to drafting a patent 
application, the inventor should be able to articulate the specific improvement in computer 
technology provided by the invention.  Any such improvements should certainly be described in 
detail in the application and in such a way that the prosecutor/litigator has ammunition to 
surmount an Alice challenge.  If the inventor is unable to articulate an improvement, the most 
cost-effective solution may be to forego filing the application.  Trade secrecy may be a more 
viable option in such circumstances, such as when the invention relates to a difficult-to-describe 
AI innovation.158  If the patent applicant is only interested in seeking protection in the United 
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States, he/she may be well-advised to file a non-publication request with the application.159  This 
will allow the application to “test the waters” with regard to subject matter eligibility.  For 
example, if overcoming an Alice challenge from the patent office results in significant narrowing 
of the patent claims, the applicant would be able to abandon the application in favor of trade 
secret protection.  Filing the non-publication request can maintain the secrecy of the applicant’s 
disclosure without jeopardizing any trade secrets contained therein. 
In spite of the criticisms of Alice, time may tell a different story as computer technology 
continues to develop in the coming decades.  The initial prediction of the death toll for software 
patents has not yet lived up to Judge Moore’s prediction, and is unlikely to reach such 
proportions if patent abandonment rates are an accurate measure of the fallout.160  It can be 
argued that Alice helped to resolve inconsistencies in how the Federal Circuit applied the 
standard, returning to the more conservative approach of the early 1980s that demanded claims 
do more than recite generic components.161  While the heightened standard may make patent 
prosecution and litigation more difficult for the inventor and attorney alike, the Alice standard 
along with the ad-hoc guidance provided by the Federal Circuit has incentivized inventors to 
focus on specific improvements in technology.  Non-practicing entities are less threatening under 
this scheme because they are less likely to invest the resources necessary to identify such specific 
improvements now that Alice has removed much of the low-hanging fruit from their reach.  
Though too early to tell, it should not be surprising if the aftermath of Alice leads to higher 
quality patents in the future, smarter investments in innovation, and less frivolous patent 
infringement suits. 
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